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Since the seminal JFE paper published by Jensen and Meckling in 1976 (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) the
agency theory has been widely applied in numerous studies in the ﬁelds of corporate ﬁnance and accounting.
Meanwhile, many researchers also notice that the conﬂicts between the principal (shareholder) and the agent
(manager) may not be the predominant issue in most of the ﬁrms around the world, since the dispersed share-
holding and separation between ownership and management are relatively uncommon phenomenon, limited
to certain type of ﬁrms (listed ﬁrms) and to certain countries (like the USA).
In the continents like Asia or Europe, clearly identiﬁable large shareholders are very prevalent, even among
listed companies. Some big corporate names are dominated by the state (like EDF, Finnair or PetroChina), or
others are controlled by families (like Michelin, LVMH or Gome). Here, the interests of these large sharehold-
ers and their managers are often aligned but the conﬂicts between large shareholders and small ones are much
present. This institutional setting extends our research frontiers and oﬀers a very fertile ground for emerging
research questions and conceiving new theories.
Therefore, we organized this themed symposium in Shanghai in March 2012 and succeeded to bring
researchers from Asia, Europe and North America to explore diﬀerent aspects of the large shareholder and
its impacts on corporate governance and accounting. Carefully selected papers from the symposium are pub-
lished in this special double issue after several rounds of revision following the symposium.
In the ﬁrst part of the special issue, the leading paper is based on author’s keynote address at the sympo-
sium. It focuses on the heterogeneity of large shareholders. The second paper brings in some perspectives from
France. In particular, it examines the monitoring mechanism played by auditors in mitigating agency prob-
lems arising from diﬀerent types of controlling shareholders. The third paper is focused on the Korean context
where the predominance of large shareholders is prevalent among listed ﬁrms. It studies how the new Korean
fair disclosure regulation aﬀects the timeliness and informativeness of earnings announcements. The fourth
paper looks into a major feature of Chinese capital market – the state-owned enterprises. It explores how
the connections of the SOE chairmen impact on the ﬁrm’s employment policies and the economic conse-
quences of overstaﬃng. Enjoy your reading!
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